3.1.2 Conceptualization
Langacker (1991:4)holds that conceptualization is mental experience or cognitive processing.It is well known, for example, that will derives from a verb meaning “want”, may imputes to its subject the strength or physical ability to do something, and can denotes the requisite knowledge or mental ability.Langacker (2002: 334-336)indicates that the evolution of English modals from sources of this kind can be seen as primarily a matter of progressive subjectification.Sweetser (1990)analyzes the root/epistemic distinction as a matter of whether the directed potency (abstract force)is manifested in the social sphere or the domain of reasoning.
For example, the MV should has a root sense when the envisaged occurrence of the landmark process is construed as an obligation imposed by the speaker.A root sense may also involve the speaker reporting an obligation imposed by some other source of authority: it can be another person, an abstract entity such as law, or even something as diffuse as societal norms or cultural expectations.In contrast, the use of epistemic modals reflects a shift in the domain: the conception is transferred from the evolution of reality itself to the evolution of the knowledge of (present)reality.Consider the following:
(87)He may be finished by now.
(88)You must already be tired.
In Examples (87)and (88), the MVs may and must express the likelihood that, as the speaker’s knowledge of current reality continues to expand, the profiled situation will prove to be part of it.Because reality is largely external, while knowledge of reality lies wholly within the province of the conceptualizer, the notion of evolutionary momentum is construed more subjectively when applied to the latter.It should be noted here that subjectivity entails the modifications of MVs so that the conceptualization concerned does not appear irrational.Thus, may and must as epistemic modality devices co-occur with the MSAs by now and already respectively.These two MSAs are the conceptualizations of time.Hence, in Examples (87)and (88)this pattern of conceptualization is involved: prediction (or judgment)+ time.
Dirven & Verspoor (1998: 95-101)expound that relating an event to the speaker’s experience of the world is technically called grounding.The participants of an event and the event as a whole need be anchored, or grounded in order to ensure successful communication.Dirven & Verspoor (ibid)point out that the grounding means at the sentence level are layered like onions, and one layer is intertwined with another, diagramed as follows in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 indicates that the grounding of speaker’s attitude always goes hand in hand with other layers of grounding such as time, event and mood.The supplementary modal devices also contribute to grounding one’s experiences or others’ experiences through one’s eyes.For instance:
(89)You may go by then.
(90)A: Maybe we can go out for a drink tonight.
B: I can’t drink too much because I’m driving.
A: Okay.
Figure 3.1 Layers of grounding (after Dirven & Verspoor, 1998: 95-101)
In Example (89), the speaker grants permission to the hearer.It is a declarative used as imperative in terms of mood; the MV may indicates the permission, and the MSA by then shows the designated time of “go”.Thus, modality and time constitute the grounding or conceptualization in Example (89).In Example (90)the speaker expresses a possibility or an ability of drinking in the form of declarative, and the MV can co-occurs with the MSA maybe, which denotes an uncertainty.In this sense the two modal devices ground two types of experience: can - ability; maybe-judgment.
Chapter 2 mentions the use of modal devices as the means of evidentiality.According to Palmer (1986)and Mushin (2001: 25), evidential modality is part of epistemic modality, diagramed as follows in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 Model of epistemic modality (after Palmer, 1986; Mushin, 2001: 25)
Figure 3.2 indicates that epistemic modality can be used for evidentials and judgments.Sometimes, the co-occurrence of MSA and MV reflects such a situation.Consider the following:
(91)Apparently I’d have to completely rewrite this chapter, but I’d be glad if you tell me I’m wrong.
In Example (91), apparently denotes sensory evidence while would and have to show judgment (speculation).The MVs would and have to can be taken as central modal devices, and apparently as supplementary or a satellite.Modality in this sense is, thus, a result of the interactions between two kinds of conceptualization, i.e., evidential and judgment.Put in another way, modality supplementing through MSAs caters to the demands of complex evidentiality.
Conceptualization may be related to some special types of clause construction.An interesting area is conditional construction, where mental space is involved.In Dancygier (1998)the phenomenon of simple present tense use in if-clauses with future reference is referred to as tense backshifting.In Dancygier (2005: 43-45)these constructions are supposed to engage in building background mental spaces against which the main clause can be used to make a prediction.In English conditionals the subordinate clause does not in fact describe an event being predicted, but some event or state of affairs which constitutes a background to the prediction made in the main clause.Consider the following:
(92)“I can’t pretend anything else - while I’m awake,” she said.“There wouldn’t be any use in trying.If I go to sleep, perhaps a dream would come and pretend for me.”
