97.1.One may conceive three sorts of duties:political,moral,and religious;correspondent to the three sorts of sanctious by which they are enforced:or the same point of conduct may be a man's duty on these three several accounts.After speaking of the one of these to put the change upon the reader,and without warning begin speaking of another,or not to let it be seen from the first which of them one is speaking of,cannot but be productive of confusion.
2.Political duty is created by punishment;or at least by the will of persons who have punishment in their hands;persons stated and certain,political superiors.
3.Religious duty is also created by punishment:by punishment expected at the hands of a person certain,the Supreme Being.
4.Moral duty is created by a kind of motive,which from the uncertainty of the persons to apply it,and of the species and agree in which it will be applied,has hardly yet got the name of punishment:by various mortifications resulting from the ill-will of persons uncertain and variable,the community in general:that is,such individuals of that community as he,whose duty is in question,shall happen to be connected with.
5.When in any of these three senses a man asserts a point of conduct to be a duty,what he asserts is the existence,actual or probable,of an external event:viz,of a punishment issuing from one or other of these sources in consequence of a contravention of the duty:an event extrinsic to,and distinct from,as well the conduct of the party spoken of,as the sentiment of him who speaks.If he persists in asserting into be a duty,but without meaning it should be understood that it is on any one of these three accounts that he looks upon it as such;all he then asserts is his own internal sentiment:all he means then is,that he feels himself pleased or displeased at the thoughts of the point of conduct in question,but without being able to tell why.In this case he should e'en say so:and not seek to give an undue influence to his own single suffrage,by delivering it in terms that purport to declare the voice either of God,or of the law,or of the people.
6.Now which of all these senses of the word our Author had in mind;in which of them all he meant to assert that it was the duty of supreme governors to make laws,I know not.Political duty is what they cannot be subject to:and to say that a duty even of the moral or religious kind to this effect is incumbent on them,seems rather a precipitate assertion.
In truth what he meant was neither more nor less,I suppose,than that he should be glad to see them do what he is speaking of;to wit,`make laws:'that is,as he explains himself,spread abroad the knowledge of them.Would he so?So indeed should I;and if asked why,what answer our Author would give I know not;but I,for my part,have no difficulty.Ianswer,because I am persuaded that it is for the benefit of the community that they (its governors)should do so.This would be enough to warrant me in my own opinion for saying that they ought to do it.For all this,I should not at any rate say that it was their duty in apolitical sense.
No more should I venture to say it was in a moral or religious sense,till I were satisfied whether they themselves thought the measures useful and feasible,and whether they were generally supposed to think so.
Were I satisfied that they themselves thought so,God then,I might say,knows they do.God,we are to suppose,will punish them if they neglect pursuing it.It is then their religious duty.Were I satisfied that the people supposed they thought so:the people,I might say,in case of such neglect,the people,by various manifestations of its ill-will,will also punish them.It is then their moral duty.
In any of these senses it must be observed,there can be no more propriety in averring it to be the duty of the supreme power to pursue the measure in question,than in averring it to be their duty to pursue any other supposable measure equally beneficial to the community.To.usher in the proposal of a measure in this peremptory and assuming guise,may be pardonable in a loose rhetorical harangue,but can never be justifiable in an exact didactic composition.Modes of private moral conduct there are indeed many,the tendency whereof is so well known and so generally acknowledged,that the observance of them may well be stiled a duty.But to apply the same term to the particular details of legislative conduct,especially newly proposed ones,is going,I think,too far,and tends only to confusion.
98.I mean for what they do,or omit to do,when acting in a body:in that body in which,when acting,they are supreme.
Because for any thing any of them do separately,or acting in bodies that are subordinate,they may any of them be punished without any disparagement to their supremacy.Not only any may be,but many are:it is what we see examples of every day.
99.V.supra,ch.II.par.11,ch.III.par.7,ch.IV.par.10.
100.Had I seen in those days what even body has seen since,instead of indolence I should have put corruption.
